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Abstract 
 
In innovation networks based on information exchange, an orchestrating actor, or hub, captures 
information from peripheral actors, promotes innovation and then distributes it to the network in 
the form of added value. This paper identifies the pricing options proposed by the orchestrating 
hub that would result in the network’s stability and efficiency. Since all the companies in this 
ecosystem can be seen as rational agents, game theory is an appropriate framework for studying 
pricing as a mechanism to promote network stability. We analyze the equilibrium conditions in 
this context and conclude that the Nash equilibrium entails the network’s stability. Our findings 
indicate that, in order to maximize the innovation power of the network, the agents should be 
charged a price proportional to the financial benefit obtained by the net innovation. This study fills 
relevant gaps in the literature on monopolistic orchestrated innovation and the pricing structures 
of network connections.  
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1. Introduction 
The efficiency of organizations is highly impacted by their connection to innovation networks. 
These networks may be established through the cooperation of independent companies 
(peripherical actors) or around a central actor (orchestrator) that manages the information flow and 
coordinates the generation of innovation for the other actors (Dhanaraj and Parkhe [2006]). 
Companies in a number of different sectors, such as retail, tourism, telecommunications and 
financial services, have opted for using external agencies provided with information which is 
shared to optimize value chain processes, reducing costs and increasing efficiency in decision-
making. 
One of the main objectives of the orchestrator is to promote its network’s stability, that is, to 
keep the actors connected, avoiding that they migrate to other networks or disconnect. Since this 
kind of network is established through a client-supplier relationship, the price charged by the 
orchestrating company will be assessed and compared by the connected companies to the value 
effectively generated by the connection. Price is therefore a key coordination component in terms 
of the network’s stability.  
 In this context, we try to answer the following questions: what is the relationship between 
pricing and the maintenance of networks’ stability? What are the characteristics of a fair pricing 
structure?  
The aforementioned environment can be seen as a game where both the peripheral actors 
and the orchestrating hub can be seen as economically rational agents who try to maximize their 
profits and where each company can adopt one of the two following strategies: to connect or not 
to connect to the network.  
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Hence, in order to answer the questions above, we propose a theoretical framework based 
on a simplified game in which an orchestrating hub manages information about companies which 
might connect to it and obtain financial gains from the innovation provided. Since every actor in 
the network can be interpreted as a rational agent, the conclusions on the effects of the different 
pricing models can be reached through the analysis of the conditions for a Nash equilibrium of the 
formulated game. The analytical interpretation of the inequalities encountered in the solution 
allows us to reach relevant conclusions on the effect of pricing on network coordination and 
stability. We also include an illustrative example which helps with the visualization and the 
interpretation of the conclusions reached analytically. Our results show that the network’s stability 
is maximized when the price paid by the agents is proportional to the benefit obtained from 
participating in the network. 
We contribute to the literature by, for the first time, associating pricing with stability and 
efficiency in different types of networks ― complete, partial and empty ― in the presence of 
externalities. Moreover, whilst studies in this area have considered a number of sectors, the 
financial segment has been less explored. We fill in this gap by illustrating our study with an 
example applicable to orchestrators such as credit rating agencies and credit bureaus who use the 
information of their own clients (e.g. banks, retail companies and tourism agencies), promote 
innovation through the storage, analysis and statistical modeling of the client’s data, and pass the 
innovation back to their clients in the form of a summary of the credit risk of private individuals, 
allowing their clients to make better decisions. 
Apart from the academic contributions, this paper has important practical implications. We 
focus on monopolistic markets where organizations acting as orchestrating hubs do not have a 
benchmark from peers to help in defining their prices. This scenario is usual in many circumstances 
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and includes cases where a very large organization shares the market with small competitors. Our 
study provides a novel support to network managers when defining optimal prices for their 
services. In other words, our framework can guide orchestrators’ managers who need to set prices 
for their services so that they guarantee the highest possible income without reducing the number 
of clients (i.e. keeping the network stable). This can be applied not only in the sector illustrated 
here but also in any business areas. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Networks’ structure and their stability 
Networks display different structures and have different typologies. They can be formal or 
informal, where the latter are those with free association or coexistence among participants and 
former are those in which participation is formally contracted. Networks can also be horizontal or 
vertical. Horizontal networks are cooperation networks in which the actors preserve their 
independence and vertical networks are hierarchical networks (Marcon and Moinet [2000]). 
Another variation of the structural form of networks is related to their density, which is measured 
by the ratio between the quantity of existing connections and the quantity of potential connections 
in the network when all participants are interconnected. The position of an actor in a network in 
relation to the other actors involved is understood as its centrality (Rowley [1997]).  
Network stability, which has been investigated in a number of studies (e.g. Dutta and 
Mutuswami [1997]; Jackson and Van den Nouweland [2005]; Bartelings et al. [2017], can be 
understood as the capability of a network to reach a non-negative growth rate, even if it allows 
members to enter or exit the network (Dhanaraj and Parkhe [2006]).  
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The analyses on this issue have focused on very specific contexts, such as computer networks 
(Avrachenkov et al. [2015]; Delgado [2010]), telecommunications (Hong and Chun [2010]), small 
and medium enterprises (Nilsen and Gausdal [2017]), mechanical engineering industry 
(Landsperger and Spieth [2011]), R&D (König et al. [2012]) and supply networks (Ostrovsky 
[2008]). We expand the range of the sectors analyzed by focusing on the financial segment. Pricing 
has also been considered in the literature on networks (e.g. Bloch and Quérou [2013]; Fainmesser 
and Galeotti [2016]) but without a clear link with network stability, which is done in this paper. 
 
2.2. Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium and networks’ stability 
Game Theory, just like the Nash Equilibrium, has been extensively used in the literature as the 
appropriate framework for understanding the formation and stability of networks because the 
strategies chosen by each actor influence the potential results of all actors (Avrachenkov et al. 
[2015]; Ozkan-Canbolat and Beraha [2016]; Anshelevich et al. [2008]; Goyal and Vega-Redondo 
[2005]; Bala and Goyal [2000]). The actors involved in networks can represent people or 
companies which, most of the times, choose to form or not to form their connections with the 
objective of maximizing their returns. From the Game Theory’s standpoint, considering that the 
utility or result achieved by each player depends on the strategy used by each of them (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]), the actors forming the network can be understood as rational 
agents who have two strategies in relation to each different actor in the network: to connect or not 
to connect.  
When each agent achieves a better result in comparison to the result from the opposite 
decision (i.e. to connect to the network or not), none of them regret their decisions. If analyzed 
over time, such network would be stable because it is in the Nash equilibrium. If the members 
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connected to the network do not regret doing it, it is expected that they will remain connected in 
the future. Likewise, the non-participating members would not decide to connect to the network. 
Given that network stability is defined as “non-negative growth rates”, the stationary state brought 
about by a Nash equilibrium (Nash [1951]) implies a stable network (Anshelevich et al. [2008]).  
In fact, it is common the existence of many scenarios with Nash equilibria and, therefore, 
multiple possibilities of reaching network stability. As a consequence, it is common to focus on 
the relationship between the “best Nash equilibrium” and the “worst Nash equilibrium”, being the 
“best equilibrium” the one that incentivizes everyone’s participation. On the other hand, the “worst 
equilibrium” does not incentivize the formation of the network and provides the worst global result 
for the group.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In the context of formal and horizontal innovation networks (Marcon and Moinet [2000]) 
constituted by rational agents (Mas-Colell at al. [1995]), this study considers different pricing 
models adopted by an orchestrating hub (Dhanaraj and Parkhe [2006]) as a network coordination 
instrument, and the relationship between these different models and the network’s stability 
(Dhanaraj and Parkhe [2006]) and density (Rowley [1997]), as well as the presence of externalities 
(Katz and Shapiro [1985]). We use Game Theory (Gibbons [1992]), in which the Nash equilibrium 
(Nash [1951]) implies network stability. 
We investigate a particular type of innovation network characterized by low density (Rowley 
[1997]) and only one agent, the orchestrating hub, with high centrality (Freeman [1991]). In this 
type of network, companies with different volumes of information connect only to the 
orchestrating hub, who, in turn, creates added value with the set of information items received and 
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make them available for all the actors connected to the network. Because it is based on free 
association and because the services provided are contracted, the network is defined as horizontal 
and formal, respectively (Marcon and Moinet [2000]). This type of structure is very common in 
the markets of credit-granting (Pagano and Jappelli [1993]), frauds, and debt collection. 
All actors, including the orchestrating hub, are private companies, which makes the use of 
the economic theory of agents rationality even more feasible (Mas-Colell et al. [1995]). They are 
rational agents in the sense that they always aim at maximizing their utility functions (i.e. their 
financial results). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the agents’ primary motivation for 
connecting to the network is financial. Thus, the network’s instrument of coordination would be 
the price stipulated by the orchestrating hub. Without loss of generality, other factors that could 
also interfere in the actors’ decision (Meyer and Rowan [1977]) have been left out for 
simplification purposes. 
The framework provided by Game Theory offers a valuable tool for assessing stability in 
networks, having been used many times towards this end (Anshelevich et al. [2008]; Papadimitriou 
[2001]). The environment can be understood as a game in which the actors choose between two 
strategies (to connect or not to connect) and benefit according to the result obtained by the 
network’s innovation, measured against the price paid for the connection. Game Theory is 
appropriate to approach this problem, especially because it involves rational agents, which is more 
acceptable when we are dealing with companies than with individuals. 
As defined by Nash [1951], an equilibrium occurs in a game when, once having chosen their 
strategies and assessed their results, none of the agents, or in this case, actors, regrets having chosen 
the strategy they picked, given the strategies picked by the other actors. Such equilibrium implies 
three possible situations: the non-existence of a network (empty network), the existence of the 
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network with a partial quantity of participants (partial network), and the existence of the network 
with all possible participating actors (complete network). The last situation can be understood in 
the present study as “the best equilibrium” in terms of network stability. It is the scenario with 
maximum density for the context proposed. 
Our study adds to the existing body of research on the relationships between the coordination 
structures and the potential levels of density and efficiency as well as the relationships between 
these scenarios and the presence of externalities. The central focus is on the pricing structure and 
the different implications it has on the density and on the presence of externalities. Different price 
structures are determined if a network is either complete, when it has maximum density, or partial, 
i.e., with density between zero and the maximum value.  
 
4. The Model 
4.1. Model with price discrimination 
Let (𝑆, 𝑓) be a game with n participants and 𝑆𝑖 the set of strategies of player 𝑖. 𝑆 = 𝑆1𝑋𝑆2𝑋 … 𝑋𝑆𝑛 
is the set of strategies which specifies all actions of a game. 𝑓 = (𝑓1(𝑥), … , 𝑓𝑛(𝑥)) is the reward 
function. Let 𝜒−𝑖 be the set of strategies of all players, except for player 𝑖. When each player 𝑖 ∈
{1, … , 𝑛} selects its strategy 𝑥𝑖, the set of resulting strategies is 𝑥 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) and the player 𝑖 
has the reward function 𝑓𝑖(𝑥). A set of strategies 𝑥
∗ ∈ 𝑆 is a Nash equilibrium when ∀𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 ∈
𝑆𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 ≠ 𝑥𝑖
∗: 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝑥−𝑖
∗ ) ≤ 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥−𝑖
∗ ).   
The reward function, 𝑓𝑖(𝑥), can be defined in terms of each peripheral actor i’s utility 
function u as: 
𝑢𝑖
0 = 𝑘𝑖𝑐1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑖)𝑐0 
𝑢𝑖
1 = 𝑘𝑟𝑐1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑟)𝑐0 + 𝑝𝑖  
(1) 
(2) 
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where the superscripts 0 and 1 correspond to not joining or joining the network, respectively. ki is 
the fraction of inhabitants known by peripheral actor i  previously to them joining the network. kr 
is the proportion of inhabitants known by the network, i.e., by the orchestrating hub. c1 and c0 are, 
respectively, the costs when the peripherical actor knows and does not know the inhabitant. 
Therefore, it is natural to assume that  𝑐1 < 𝑐0.  pi is the price charged by the orchestrating hub. 
Given the Nash equilibrium conditions specified above and Eqs. (1) and (2), we have 𝑢𝑖
1 ≤
𝑢𝑖
0, ∀𝑖, which results in:  
(𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) ≥ 𝑝𝑖 
Under this condition, it is possible to find a price per peripheral actor which maximizes the 
size of the network. Since 𝑘𝑟 ≥ 𝑘𝑖  and 𝑐0 > 𝑐1 by construction, then there is a 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 0 that allows 
for the equilibrium in any case. (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖) can be understood as the difference between the fraction 
of inhabitants known by the network and the fraction of inhabitants known by the company 
connected. The subtraction (𝑐0 − 𝑐1) represents the difference between the cost of making a 
decision for an unknown client and the cost of making a decision for a known client. Thus, 
(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) is the financial gain from the network’s innovation for each client, whose decisions will 
now be made based on information from the network.  
(𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) means the innovation gain appropriated by the network from the 
company connected in relation to the fraction of inhabitants whose decisions are made for a lower 
price due to the innovation network. This is the main conclusion of this work: the price established 
by the monopolistic orchestrating hub for each company connected to the network should be 
proportional to the financial gain from the innovation provided by the network for each peripheral 
actor. 
(3) 
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Let 𝑅 be the set of actors that have decided to connect to the network. The orchestrating 
hub’s profit L consists of the sum of the prices paid by the peripheral actors net of the cost 𝐶 
incurred by the hub, i.e., 𝐿 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝑅 − 𝐶.  
For a Nash equilibrium to be achieved in the game, no peripheral actor can regret the decision 
made, given the respective choices made by all of the other actors. Thus, the reward function of 
the strategy chosen by all actors must have a result which is equal to or lower than the result of the 
rejected strategy, since we are dealing with a problem of cost reduction. 
  
4.2. Model without price discrimination  
The model introduced in the previous section is based on the highly feasible principle that the 
orchestrating hub can define a specific price 𝑝𝑖 for each peripheral actor i. Nonetheless, it is also 
important to adapt the model to situations where the orchestrating hub must charge all companies 
the same price 𝑝 (e.g. due to a regulatory demand). In this case, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝, ∀𝑖. 
 
4.2.1. Empty network 
When no client is connected to the network, the number of actors in the network is given by an 
empty set 𝑅 = {∅} and, consequently, the number of inhabitants known by the network is also 
given by an empty set. This means that the fraction of inhabitants known by the network 𝑘𝑟 is zero. 
In this case, all actors ai have decided for the 𝑥𝑖
0 strategy, that is, not connecting to the 
network. In order to satisfy the Nash equilibrium condition in which none of the actors participate 
in the network, then 𝑢𝑖
0 ≤ 𝑢𝑖
1, ∀𝑖, i.e., the cost of isolation must be always lower than or equal to 
the cost of participating in a network in which the actor concerned would be the only participant. 
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In this context, using the previous notation, we have 𝑘𝑖𝑐1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑖)𝑐0 ≤ 𝑘𝑖𝑐1 +
(1 − 𝑘𝑖)𝑐0 + 𝑝, i.e., 𝑝 ≥ 0. Since 𝑝 ≥ 0 by construction, the Nash equilibrium would always 
occur. Thus, for any non-negative price stipulated by the orchestrating hub, the non-existence of 
the network is in itself a Nash equilibrium, as it has been shown in the literature (Bala and Goyal 
[2000]). 
 
4.2.2. Partial network 
In order to demonstrate the Nash equilibrium in partial or incomplete networks, we define a 
scenario with three actors, 𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗 , 𝑎𝑙, with three different levels of knowledge about the population, 
𝑘𝑖 , 𝑘𝑗 , 𝑘𝑙, where 𝑘𝑖 < 𝑘𝑗 < 𝑘𝑙. Let us suppose a network has been formed by the actors 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑎𝑗, 
where 𝑎𝑙 opted for isolation, i.e., in the resulting network, the set of inhabitants known is the union 
of the inhabitants known by the actors 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑎𝑗. A Nash equilibrium exists in the game when the 
conditions for equilibrium are satisfied for all peripheral actors. 
First of all, let us analyze the condition for equilibrium of 𝑎𝑗. Since 𝑎𝑗 opted for connecting, 
in order for this actor to be in equilibrium, its decision-making costs when participating in the 
network must be lower than or equal to its decision-making costs when in isolation, 𝑢𝑖
1 ≤ 𝑢𝑖
0. 
According to Inequality (3), 𝑎𝑗  will be in Nash equilibrium whenever 𝑝
∗ ≤ (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 −
𝑐1), that is, as long as the single price stipulated by the orchestrating hub is lower than or equal to 
the financial gain from the innovation.  
By analyzing the condition for equilibrium for 𝑎𝑖, we also come to (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) ≥ 𝑝, 
by analogy. Substituting 𝑝 with the price limit 𝑝∗ paid by 𝑎𝑗, we have (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) ≥
(𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1). Since 𝑘𝑖 < 𝑘𝑗, then (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖) > (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗), thus, the price 𝑝
∗ which satisfies 
the equilibrium of 𝑎𝑗, also necessarily satisfies the equilibrium of 𝑎𝑖. 
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To complete the demonstration, we still have to show that 𝑎𝑙 can be in equilibrium when in 
isolation from the network. For such, the isolation strategy adopted by 𝑎𝑙 must have lower costs 
than the costs it would incur if it were participating in the network, that is, 𝑢𝑙
0 ≤ 𝑢𝑙
1. We have that 
𝑢𝑙
0 = 𝑘𝑙𝑐1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑙)𝑐0. To verify 𝑢𝑙
1, we need to consider the set of inhabitants known by the 
network if the actor 𝑎𝑙 decided to participate in it (i.e. the summation of the inhabitants known by 
the three actors). In this case, the fraction (𝑘𝑟
′ ) known by the network with the participation of 
𝑎𝑙 would be higher than or equal to the fraction of the resulting network 𝑘𝑟. 
Developing the condition for equilibrium and considering the maximum price 𝑝∗ that the 
orchestrating hub could stipulate so that 𝑎𝑗  is in equilibrium, we have: 
(𝑘𝑟
′ −  𝑘𝑙) ≤ (𝑘𝑟 −  𝑘𝑗)   
The inequality indicates that, as long as the fraction of extra inhabitants known by the 
network that would be formed with the presence of 𝑎𝑙 is smaller than or equal to the difference 
between the fraction of the existing network and the biggest participating actor in equilibrium, in 
this case, 𝑎𝑗, it will be beneficial for 𝑎𝑙 to remain in isolation. This is explained by the fact that 𝑎𝑗 
is the biggest actor participating in the resulting network and it pays the maximum price 𝑝∗ to be 
able to have a lower decision price for a fraction of the population. With this price determined by 
the orchestrating hub, 𝑎𝑗 would only regret its isolation if it could observe that it could have a gain 
equal to or higher than the amount spared by the network formed due to its presence. 
In practical terms, we can think of a credit bureau in which the biggest user can reduce the 
costs for 30% of the population, on top of those they already know. Naturally, the bureau would 
determine the price according to this fraction. The new user, then, would only be willing to pay 
the price in question if it could obtain a gain of the same nature in the new network in which it 
would participate. 
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4.2.3. Complete network 
Making use of a similar context to the one formulated in the former section, we can study a network 
in which at least one actor has more information k about the population than the others, i.e., ∃𝑗 ∈
𝑅|𝑘𝑗 > 𝑘𝑖 , ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. If we set a specific price 𝑝
∗ such that (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) = 𝑝
∗, since 𝑘𝑗 >
𝑘𝑖  ⇒ (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) > 𝑝
∗, i.e., the same price that satisfies the equilibrium for the actor that 
has the most knowledge of the inhabitants of the region to participate in the network, it is easy to 
notice that p* will necessarily satisfy the condition for equilibrium of all other peripheral actors 
which have less knowledge about the population. 
As an example of this situation, imagine the price for which the biggest bank of a particular 
region would decide to participate in the network in equilibrium making use of a credit bureau. 
This same price would be beneficial for all other banks of the region as they could count on the 
same network innovation, though with a smaller client base. Such situation opens the door to the 
discussion on the presence of externalities in innovation networks. An externality occurs when the 
utility observed is different from the expected utility at the time actors join the network. 
 
4.2.4. Network effects without price discrimination 
To delve deeper into the issue of the presence of externalities in the pricing of the innovation 
network, we use the same scenario constructed in the section concerning partial networks, where 
we have three actors, 𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗 , 𝑎𝑙 and the following order of the proportion of the population 
respectively known by those actors: 𝑘𝑖 < 𝑘𝑗 < 𝑘𝑙. Suppose that the orchestrating hub establishes 
a price 𝑝∗ for the network, such that (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) = 𝑝
∗. It has already been verified in the 
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aforementioned section that the same 𝑝∗ satisfying the equilibrium of participation for 𝑎𝑗 will 
necessarily satisfy the equilibrium of participation for 𝑎𝑖. Let us see each case separately: 
For actor 𝑎𝑗, since the condition for equilibrium is (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) ≥ 𝑝
∗, the actor finds 
Nash equilibrium in the participation by connecting to the network because the value 𝑝∗ stipulated 
by the orchestrating hub is exactly the same as the economic value of the potential innovation 
appropriated by actor 𝑎𝑗. 
For actor 𝑎𝑖, since 𝑘𝑖 < 𝑘𝑗 ⇒ (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) > 𝑝
∗, this actor that knows less about the 
population is not in Nash equilibrium by participating in the network but it has a financial 
advantage in relation to actor 𝑎𝑗. This is explained by the fact that when ai pays the same price 
paid by actor 𝑎𝑗, which has more knowledge about the population, it appropriates more innovation 
than 𝑎𝑗 because its knowledge about the population is smaller and even so it can make use of the 
same complete potential of the network as 𝑎𝑗 does. 
In this case, we can calculate the value of the externality of actor 𝑎𝑖  in relation to actor 𝑎𝑗. It 
is easy to verify that the price limit that would make actor 𝑎𝑖 participate in the network would be 
𝑝 = (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1). However, the price paid was 𝑝
∗ = (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) < 𝑝. Calculating 
the difference between the two scenarios, we have the value of the positive externality of 𝑎𝑖 in 
relation to 𝑎𝑗, which is called 𝑒𝑖,𝑗, or externality of 𝑎𝑖 in relation to 𝑎𝑗. 
𝑒𝑖,𝑗 = (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) − (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) = (𝑘𝑗 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1)       
 
That is, for not working with discrimination of price for different actors, the orchestrating 
hub allowed actor 𝑎𝑖 to have an economic advantage  (𝑘𝑗 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1) from the innovation 
whose value is higher than the economic value it paid, which was 𝑝∗ = (𝑘𝑟 − 𝑘𝑗)(𝑐0 − 𝑐1).  
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Thus, when prices for different actors are not discriminated, the orchestrating hub allows the 
actors for whom the network has the highest added value to pay the same value as the other actors 
for whom the network has lower added value. The conclusions concerning externalities are valid 
both for partial and complete networks. 
 
5. Simulations 
5.1. Market specification 
In order to illustrate the models introduced in Section 4, we simulate a market with 10,000 
inhabitants and 20 companies (peripheral actors) where each company knows a set of inhabitants 
of the region but needs to make decisions concerning inhabitants it does not know. These decisions 
could, for example, refer to credit granting, fraud analysis, insurance policy issuance, or any other 
type of analysis for which having information about the inhabitants is necessary and useful. 
A level of propensity to know inhabitants is assigned to each of the 20 companies by means 
of trials using adaptations of the exponential probability. Likewise, each of the inhabitants is 
assigned a level of propensity of being known. Both the companies and the inhabitants are assigned 
different levels in relation to one another in an attempt to reproduce distributions commonly 
encountered in the market (i.e. the companies have different sizes and the inhabitants have distinct 
levels of credit use). The distribution of inhabitants per company, as well as the proportion of 
inhabitants known by each company are shown in Fig. 1 - Panels A and B, respectively.  
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 
 
In this example, the orchestrating hub is a credit bureau and the 20 companies which can 
participate in the network are banks, financial companies and retailers that wish to grant credit to 
Lustosa, Albertin and Moreira 
the inhabitants of the region. The orchestrating hub has a fixed cost of $3.00, no matter the quantity 
of actors connected to the network. 
The companies may try to make credit granting decisions by themselves or connected to the 
network with different decision-making costs. When the companies try to make a decision in 
isolation, they have a cost of $10 for the clients they do not know and $1 for those they know. 
Company #17, for instance, has an average decision-making cost of 
$1(0.054)+$10(0.946)=$9.514.  
 
5.2. Scenario without price discrimination 
Assume that the orchestrating hub has stipulated a fixed price of $2.00 for any company interested 
to participate in the network and that the companies that decided to connect are those marked with 
a YES in the column “Connection” in Table 1 - Panel A. 
In the last row of Panel A, we have the price stipulated by the orchestrating hub ($2.00). Just 
to the right of the price, we have the fixed cost incurred by the orchestrating hub, $3.00. Each row 
of the table represents a company, numbered from 1 to 20, with their respective actions and results. 
In the second column, we see that eight companies have connected to the network in this game. 
Thus, the profit enjoyed by the orchestrating hub is 8 x $2.00 - $3.00 = $13.00. In the third column, 
we have the proportion of the population known by each company, with the last row showing the 
proportion of the population known by the network. In this case, the union of the eight companies 
that have connected to the network resulted in the orchestrating hub knowing a proportion of 
28.07%. The columns “Cost – Isolation” and “Cost – Participation” show the cost they would have 
or have had if they remained isolated or if they participated in the network, respectively. The 
column “Economies” represents in positive value the financial gain the company would have (or 
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has had) for participating in the network in comparison with the financial gain associated with not 
participating. For example, company #2, which chooses not to participate in the network, has a 
decision-making cost of $9.82 since it knows only 1.98% of the population. If it had chosen to 
connect to the network, sharing, thus, the information it possessed and paying $2.00 per 
consultation, company #2 would have had an average decision-making cost of $9.39, which would 
have resulted in economies of $0.43 (=$9.82 - $9.39) in costs. Since it would have been preferable 
for the company to participate in the network, it regrets the strategy chosen. Therefore, the game 
formulated does not reach a Nash equilibrium. 
The biggest company, #4, which can be interpreted as a large bank in the region, decides not 
to connect to the network. If it had chosen to connect, it would have had a disadvantage of $0.96 
per consultation in comparison to its results in isolation. Thus, it does not regret its decision. 
A Nash equilibrium can be verified in empty networks. For the data generated, as it is shown 
in Section 4.2.1, we have an equilibrium for not participating in the network for any non-negative 
price, once none of the companies regret being in isolation. To illustrate this possibility, an empty 
network was generated whose cost of connection is only one cent (see Table 1 - Panel B). Even 
so, none of the companies regret not having connected to the network, because they would be 
paying to use a network that contains only their own information.  
The next simulation studies the case of the incomplete or partial networks in which a Nash 
equilibrium is achieved. In this case, all companies connected to the network obtain economies in 
their decision-making even considering that they paid the price stipulated by the orchestrating hub, 
while those which choose isolation also obtain a financial advantage for not paying the connection 
price. The simulation is run with the same 20 companies. The price stipulated by the orchestrating 
hub is $3.00. According to the results in Table 2 - Panel A, all companies have decided to connect 
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paying the price defined, except for companies #4, #6 and #18, which are the biggest companies 
in terms of level of knowledge about the population. The resulting network, thus, is comprised of 
17 companies and all of these achieve economies for using the network, which collectively knows 
46.45% of the population. It is easy to notice that the connection to the network is more beneficial 
for some companies than for others. Company #13, for instance, which knows a very small 
proportion of the population, achieves average economies of $1.12 for using the network, even 
after paying the stipulated price. On the other hand, company #9 has economies of only $0.30, 
since alone it already knows 9.79% of the inhabitants. This is one more example of externality.  
The three largest companies, #6, #18 and #4 choose not to connect to the network and do not 
regret their decisions either. If they had chosen to connect, the price charged by the orchestrating 
hub would make it unfeasible for the companies to have any economies with decision-making 
costs generated by the usage of the network. This suggests that the orchestrating hub should 
practice a lower price for these companies, once it wishes to maximize the quantity of companies 
connected and, consequently, its profit. 
Still in the model without price discrimination, an interesting exercise is to calculate the 
highest price that the orchestrating hub could practice so that the network is complete and in 
equilibrium. We find that such maximum price is $2.57. This is the price limit that makes company 
#4 indifferent to participation, i.e., it does not regret having chosen to connect with the network1. 
In short, the simulation results in Table 1 - Panel B confirm that empty networks entail Nash 
equilibrium as shown in Section 4.2.1. We also see that the higher the proportion ki of the 
population known by company i the less it benefits from joining the network (see Table 1 - Panel 
A and Table 2 - Panel A). Consequently, the size of the population known a priori by companies 
                                                 
1 The detailed results are not reported here due to space constraints but they are available upon request. 
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is a vital information that should be considered by orchestrators when defining their prices. This 
corroborates the models presented in Section 4.2. 
 
5.3. Scenario with price discrimination 
In the previous simulations, the orchestrating hub stipulates one single price for all of the 20 
companies (peripheral actors). Now we discuss the simulation of the model presented in Section 
4.1. In this model, the orchestrating hub raises the prices for each company up to the limit that 
would make them not regret having connected to the complete network. Naturally, then, the 
orchestrating hub appropriates itself of all the economies generated by the network and leaves all 
companies with zero economies. In doing so, the orchestrating hub has maximum profit, as shown 
in Table 2 - Panel B.  
Based on these results, we conclude that the profit of the orchestrating hub with price 
discrimination is much higher than in the simulation without price discrimination: $98.16 versus 
$48.40. We also note that the price defined for each company is inversely proportional to the 
population known by it. The prices can vary from $2.57 for company #4 to $5.73 for companies 
#13 and #14, which know a very small proportion of the population.  
Therefore, our findings in this section indicate that price discrimination leads to higher 
profits compared to situations where prices are the same for all actors and, as found in the previous 
section and in accordance with the models in Section 4, the size of the population known a priori 
by companies should be taken into account in the price definition.
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Table 1. Results of a partial and an empty network. 
Company Panel A – Partial network with a price of $2.00 Panel B – Empty network with a price of $0.01 
 
Connection Proportion 
known 
Cost - 
Isolation 
Cost - 
Participation 
Economies Regrets Connection Proportion 
known 
Cost - 
Isolation 
Cost - 
Participation 
Economies Regrets 
1 YES 5.56% $ 9.50 $ 9.47 $ 0.03 NO NO 5.56% $ 9.50 $ 9.51 ($ 0.01) NO 
2 NO 1.98% $ 9.82 $ 9.39 $ 0.43 YES NO 1.98% $ 9.82 $ 9.83 ($ 0.01) NO 
3 YES 4.93% $ 9.56 $ 9.47 $ 0.08 NO NO 4.93% $ 9.56 $ 9.57 ($ 0.01) NO 
4 NO 35.76% $ 6.78 $ 7.74 ($ 0.96) NO NO 35.76% $ 6.78 $ 6.79 ($ 0.01) NO 
5 NO 2.34% $ 9.79 $ 9.36 $ 0.43 YES NO 2.34% $ 9.79 $ 9.80 ($ 0.01) NO 
6 NO 20.68% $ 8.14 $ 8.52 ($ 0.38) NO NO 20.68% $ 8.14 $ 8.15 ($ 0.01) NO 
7 NO 4.69% $ 9.58 $ 9.24 $ 0.34 YES NO 4.69% $ 9.58 $ 9.59 ($ 0.01) NO 
8 YES 3.74% $ 9.66 $ 9.47 $ 0.19 NO NO 3.74% $ 9.66 $ 9.67 ($ 0.01) NO 
9 NO 9.79% $ 9.12 $ 8.98 $ 0.14 YES NO 9.79% $ 9.12 $ 9.13 ($ 0.01) NO 
10 NO 6.76% $ 9.39 $ 9.17 $ 0.22 YES NO 6.76% $ 9.39 $ 9.40 ($ 0.01) NO 
11 NO 9.52% $ 9.14 $ 9.04 $ 0.10 YES NO 9.52% $ 9.14 $ 9.15 ($ 0.01) NO 
12 YES 2.31% $ 9.79 $ 9.47 $ 0.32 NO NO 2.31% $ 9.79 $ 9.80 ($ 0.01) NO 
13 NO 0.65% $ 9.94 $ 9.44 $ 0.50 YES NO 0.65% $ 9.94 $ 9.95 ($ 0.01) NO 
14 YES 0.67% $ 9.94 $ 9.47 $ 0.47 NO NO 0.67% $ 9.94 $ 9.95 ($ 0.01) NO 
15 YES 2.51% $ 9.77 $ 9.47 $ 0.30 NO NO 2.51% $ 9.77 $ 9.78 ($ 0.01) NO 
16 NO 3.24% $ 9.71 $ 9.32 $ 0.39 YES NO 3.24% $ 9.71 $ 9.72 ($ 0.01) NO 
17 NO 5.4% $ 9.51 $ 9.24 $ 0.28 YES NO 5.4% $ 9.51 $ 9.52 ($ 0.01) NO 
18 NO 25.01% $ 7.75 $ 8.32 ($ 0.57) NO NO 25.01% $ 7.75 $ 7.76 ($ 0.01) NO 
19 YES 9.55% $ 9.14 $ 9.47 ($ 0.33) YES NO 9.55% $ 9.14 $ 9.15 ($ 0.01) NO 
20 YES 7.93% $ 9.29 $ 9.47 ($ 0.19) YES NO 7.93% $ 9.29 $ 9.30 ($ 0.01) NO 
Network 8 companies 28.07% Price: $2.00 
Cost-
network: 
$3.00 
Profit: $13.00 0 companies 0.00% 
Price: 
$0.01 
Cost-
network: 
$3.00 
Profit: ($3.00) 
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Table 2. Results of networks in equilibrium. 
Company Panel A – Partial network with a fixed price of $3.00 Panel B – Complete network with price discrimination 
 
Connection Proportion 
known 
Cost - 
Isolation 
Cost - 
Participation 
Economies Regrets Connection Proportion 
known 
Cost - 
Isolation 
Cost - 
Participation 
Economies Regrets 
1 YES 5.56% $ 9.50 $ 8.82 $ 0.68 NO YES 5.56% $ 9.50 $ 9.50 $ 0 NO 
2 YES 1.98% $ 9.82 $ 8.82 $ 1.00 NO YES 1.98% $ 9.82 $ 9.82 $ 0 NO 
3 YES 4.93% $ 9.56 $ 8.82 $ 0.74 NO YES 4.93% $ 9.56 $ 9.56 $ 0 NO 
4 NO 35.76% $ 6.78 $ 7.85 ($ 1.07) NO YES 35.76% $ 6.78 $ 6.78 $ 0 NO 
5 YES 2.34% $ 9.79 $ 8.82 $ 0.97 NO YES 2.34% $ 9.79 $ 9.79 $ 0 NO 
6 NO 20.68% $ 8.14 $ 8.27 ($ 0.13) NO YES 20.68% $ 8.14 $ 8.14 $ 0 NO 
7 YES 4.69% $ 9.58 $ 8.82 $ 0.76 NO YES 4.69% $ 9.58 $ 9.58 $ 0 NO 
8 YES 3.74% $ 9.66 $ 8.82 $ 0.84 NO YES 3.74% $ 9.66 $ 9.66 $ 0 NO 
9 YES 9.79% $ 9.12 $ 8.82 $ 0.30 NO YES 9.79% $ 9.12 $ 9.12 $ 0 NO 
10 YES 6.76% $ 9.39 $ 8.82 $ 0.57 NO YES 6.76% $ 9.39 $ 9.39 $ 0 NO 
11 YES 9.52% $ 9.14 $ 8.82 $ 0.32 NO YES 9.52% $ 9.14 $ 9.14 $ 0 NO 
12 YES 2.31% $ 9.79 $ 8.82 $ 0.97 NO YES 2.31% $ 9.79 $ 9.79 $ 0 NO 
13 YES 0.65% $ 9.94 $ 8.82 $ 1.12 NO YES 0.65% $ 9.94 $ 9.99 $ 0 NO 
14 YES 0.67% $ 9.94 $ 8.82 $ 1.12 NO YES 0.67% $ 9.94 $ 9.94 $ 0 NO 
15 YES 2.51% $ 9.77 $ 8.82 $ 0.95 NO YES 2.51% $ 9.77 $ 9.77 $ 0 NO 
16 YES 3.24% $ 9.71 $ 8.82 $ 0.89 NO YES 3.24% $ 9.71 $ 9.71 $ 0 NO 
17 YES 5.4% $ 9.51 $ 8.82 $ 0.69 NO YES 5.4% $ 9.51 $ 9.51 $ 0 NO 
18 NO 25.01% $ 7.75 $ 8.19 ($ 0.44) NO YES 25.01% $ 7.75 $ 7.75 $ 0 NO 
19 YES 9.55% $ 9.14 $ 8.82 $ 0.32 NO YES 9.55% $ 9.14 $ 9.14 $ 0 NO 
20 YES 7.93% $ 9.29 $ 8.82 $ 0.47 NO YES 7.93% $ 9.29 $ 9.29 $ 0 NO 
Network 
17 
companies 
46.45% Price: $3.00 
Cost-
network: 
$3.00 
Profit: $48.40 
20 
companies 
64.35% 
Price: 
Variable 
Cost-
network: 
$3.00 
Profit: $98.16 
Lustosa, Albertin and Moreira 
 
5.4. Scenario with price negotiation 
In the previous discussions, we assumed that prices are fixed by the orchestrating 
hub and accepted by actors without any negotiation. However, in practice, it is 
very important to assess network stability when agents are allowed to negotiate 
prices. In this section, company #4 (the one with most information about the 
consumer market) is allowed to negotiate prices with the credit bureau. In these 
circumstances, we initially analyze a network in equilibrium made up of all 
companies, except for company #4.  
The network formed with 19 participants knows 58.02% of the inhabitants 
of the region. If it is allowed that company #4 negotiates the price of its 
participation with the orchestrating hub and the orchestrating hub aggregates 
company #4 to the network, it increases the proportion of inhabitants known from 
58.02% to 64.35%. Since the price each company is willing to pay is proportional 
to the difference between the proportion of inhabitants known by the network and 
the proportion of inhabitants known by each company, the orchestrating hub 
knows it could raise the price charged to all of the other companies in case 
company #4 participated in the network. It is beneficial for the orchestrating hub, 
for example, to let company #4 join the network for free, because doing so would 
increase its profit from $84.76 to $95.59. This result (not shown in Table 3) is 
obtained by adding up the price paid by each of the 19 companies in Table 3 - 
Panel A minus the fixed cost of $3.00 incurred by the network. 
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Table 3. Networks with price negotiation. 
Company Panel A – All companies connecting except for company #4 Panel B – All companies connecting (including company #4) 
 
Proportion 
known 
Cost - 
Isolation 
Cost - 
Participation 
Prices Economies Regrets Proportion 
known 
Cost - 
Isolation 
Cost - 
Participation 
Prices Economies Regrets 
1 5.56% $ 9.50 $ 9.50 $ 4.72 0 NO 5.56% $ 9.50 $ 9.50 $ 5.29 0 NO 
2 1.98% $ 9.82 $ 9.82 $ 5.04 0 NO 1.98% $ 9.82 $ 9.82 $ 5.61 0 NO 
3 4.93% $ 9.56 $ 9.56 $ 4.78 0 NO 4.93% $ 9.56 $ 9.56 $ 5.35 0 NO 
4 35.76%      35.76% $ 6.78 ($ 7.26) ($ 10.83) 14.04 NO 
5 2.34% $ 9.79 $ 9.79 $ 5.01 0 NO 2.34% $ 9.79 $ 9.79 $ 5.58 0 NO 
6 20.68% $ 8.14 $ 8.14 $ 3.36 0 NO 20.68% $ 8.14 $ 8.14 $ 3.93 0 NO 
7 4.69% $ 9.58 $ 9.58 $ 4.80 0 NO 4.69% $ 9.58 $ 9.58 $ 5.37 0 NO 
8 3.74% $ 9.66 $ 9.66 $ 4.89 0 NO 3.74% $ 9.66 $ 9.66 $ 5.45 0 NO 
9 9.79% $ 9.12 $ 9.12 $ 4.34 0 NO 9.79% $ 9.12 $ 9.12 $ 4.91 0 NO 
10 6.76% $ 9.39 $ 9.39 $ 4.61 0 NO 6.76% $ 9.39 $ 9.39 $ 5.18 0 NO 
11 9.52% $ 9.14 $ 9.14 $ 4.37 0 NO 9.52% $ 9.14 $ 9.14 $ 4.93 0 NO 
12 2.31% $ 9.79 $ 9.79 $ 5.01 0 NO 2.31% $ 9.79 $ 9.79 $ 5.58 0 NO 
13 0.65% $ 9.94 $ 9.99 $ 5.16 0 NO 0.65% $ 9.94 $ 9.94 $ 5.73 0 NO 
14 0.67% $ 9.94 $ 9.94 $ 5.16 0 NO 0.67% $ 9.94 $ 9.94 $ 5.73 0 NO 
15 2.51% $ 9.77 $ 9.77 $ 5.00 0 NO 2.51% $ 9.77 $ 9.77 $ 5.57 0 NO 
16 3.24% $ 9.71 $ 9.71 $ 4.93 0 NO 3.24% $ 9.71 $ 9.71 $ 5.50 0 NO 
17 5.4% $ 9.51 $ 9.51 $ 4.74 0 NO 5.4% $ 9.51 $ 9.51 $ 5.31 0 NO 
18 25.01% $ 7.75 $ 7.75 $ 2.97 0 NO 25.01% $ 7.75 $ 7.75 $ 3.54 0 NO 
19 9.55% $ 9.14 $ 9.14 $ 4.36 0 NO 9.55% $ 9.14 $ 9.14 $ 4.93 0 NO 
20 7.93% $ 9.29 $ 9.29 $ 4.51 0 NO 7.93% $ 9.29 $ 9.29 $ 5.08 0 NO 
Network 58.02% 
Price: 
Variable 
Cost-
network: 
$3.00 
 Profit: $84.76 64.35% 
Price: 
Variable 
Cost-
network: 
$3.00 
 Profit: $84.76 
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Following this line of reasoning, if the credit bureau wishes to increase or keep 
its profit, it could pay company #4 to join the network up to the limit that would make 
its profit be higher than or equal to $84.76. That is, the credit bureau would be willing 
to pay $10.83 to company #4. The results are shown in Table 3 - Panel B and indicate 
equilibrium as no company regrets participating in the network. 
It is worth noting that the value of each company to the network depends not 
only on the proportion of the population the company knows, but also on the 
proportion of clients known by the company but unknown by the network. In our 
example, company #4 knows by itself 35.76% of the population, but what it adds to 
the network in terms of information is 6.33%, which is the proportion of inhabitants 
that the network in Table 3 - Panel B has beyond that which the network in Table 3 - 
Panel A has. 
These results reveal that an orchestrator should observe the ratio of the 
population known by each actor and by the network when setting the price for its 
service. Hence, companies would be encouraged to join the network because the price 
stipulated would bring about financial advantages to them. As a consequence, the 
network and, in particular, the orchestrator hub would also benefit from the increasing 
number of members.  
In sum, all the scenarios considered above support the conclusion that pricing 
is intimately associated with the network’s stability, density and profitability in 
different types of networks. 
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6. Conclusions 
We use Game Theory to analyze the relationship between the pricing structures 
proposed by the orchestrating hub and the network’s stability and efficiency. This is 
novel in the literature and has yielded unprecedented conclusions that will be useful 
for decision-makers in different companies, such as bureaus for credit information, 
and fraud and insurance claims.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, the price structure defined a 
priori by the orchestrating hub is related to the network’s stability. Different price 
structures have direct impact on the trend of permanence, increase or deterioration of 
the network. Second, the pricing structure proposed is related to the network’s 
efficiency and density. Structures with or without price discrimination for the 
peripheral actors and their respective prices can in themselves imply empty, partial or 
complete networks. Third, pricing structures without price discrimination for actors 
of different sizes imply the presence of externalities in the network. Last but not least, 
the pricing structure which maximizes the network’s density and eliminates 
externalities is that in which the price is proportional to the gains from the innovation 
appropriated by the peripheral actors. 
From the academic point of view, where only cost allocation structures are 
studied, such framework contributes to filling in an existing gap in the study of 
horizontal, formal networks endowed with orchestrating hubs. In the scenario in 
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which the actors are companies and the connections are established for contracting 
services, the price charged has proved to be an important tool in promoting the 
network’s stability, which is described as one of the three main objectives to be 
promoted by the orchestrating hub (Dhanaraj and Parkhe [2006]).  
This work, however, has some limitations, although none of them depreciates 
the conclusions reached for the proposed scenario. First and foremost, the market 
studied here is a monopolistic one. The presence of a competing orchestrating hub 
would change the study and is beyond our scope. This is, therefore, a suggestion for 
further studies in this area. 
For simplification, we assume that costs incurred by the orchestrating hub are 
fixed, no matter the number of actors connected to the network. It would be reasonable 
to assume that costs depend on how many actors are connected to the network. 
Nonetheless, using variable costs in this study would have made it more complex 
without changing its conclusions as far as the decisions of the peripheral actors are 
concerned. This issue remains as an idea for extending the models developed here. 
The assumption of rationality of companies and individuals that may influence 
stability can also be seen as a limitation of this study. In order to apply Game Theory, 
the starting point has to be the agents’ rationality and, in this case, the price would be 
the determining factor in the context proposed in our analyses. It is known that other 
factors may interfere in decision making but such factors are not in the scope of the 
present work and their inclusion is left for future research. 
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Fig 1. Distribution of simulated data. 
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